Chapter 8. The Early History of Property

　　The Roman Institutional Treatises， after giving their definition of the various forms and modifications of ownership， proceed to discuss the Natural Modes of Acquiring Property. Those who are unfamiliar with the history of jurisprudence are not likely to look upon these “natural modes” of acquisition as possessing， at first sight， either much speculative or much practical interest. The wild animal which is snared or killed by the hunter， the soil which is added to our field by the imperceptible deposits of a river， the tree which strikes its roots into our ground， are each said by the Roman lawyers to be acquired by us naturally. The older jurisconsults had doubtless observed that such acquisitions were universally sanctioned by the usages of the little societies around them， and thus the lawyers of a later age， finding them classed in the ancient Jus Gentium， and perceiving them to be of the simplest description， allotted them a place among the ordinances of Nature. The dignity with which they were invested has gone on increasing in modern times till it is quite out of proportion to their original importance. Theory has made them its favourite food， and has enabled them to exercise the most serious influence on practice.

　　It will be necessary for us to attend to one only among these “natural modes of acquisition，” Occupatio or Occupancy. Occupancy is the advisedly taking possession of that which at the moment is the property of no man， with the view （adds the technical definition） of acquiring property in it for yourself. The objects which the Roman lawyers called res nullius —— things which have not or have never had an owner —— can only be ascertained by enumerating them. Among things which never had an owner are wild animals， fishes， wild fowl， jewels disinterred for the first time， and lands newly discovered or never before cultivated. Among things which have not an owner are moveables which have been abandoned， lands which have been deserted， and （an anomalous but most formidable item） the property of an enemy. In all these objects the full rights of dominion were acquired by the Occupant， who first took possession of them with the intention of keeping them as his own —— an intention which， in certain cases， had to be manifested by specific acts. It is not difficult， I think， to understand the universality which caused the practice of Occupancy to be placed by one generation of Roman lawyers in the Law common to all Nations， and the simplicity which occasioned its being attributed by another to the Law of Nature. But for its fortunes in modern legal history we are less prepared by a priori considerations. The Roman principle of Occupancy， and the rules into which the jurisconsults expanded it， are the source of all modern International Law on the subject of Capture in War and of the acquisition of sovereign rights in newly discovered countries. They have also supplied a theory of the Origin of Property， which is at once the popular theory， and the theory which， in one form or another， is acquiesced in by the great majority of speculative jurists.

　　I have said that the Roman principle of Occupancy has determined the tenor of that chapter of International Law which is concerned with Capture in War. The Law of Warlike Capture derives its rules from the assumption that communities are remitted to a state of nature by the outbreak of hostilities， and that， in the artificial natural condition thus produced， the institution of private property falls into abeyance so far as concerns the belligerents. As the later writers on the Law of Nature have always been anxious to maintain that private property was in some sense sanctioned by the system which they were expounding， the hypothesis that an enemy''s property is res nullius has seemed to them perverse and shocking， and they are careful to stigmatise it as a mere fiction of jurisprudence. But， as soon as the Law of Nature is traced to its source in the Jus Gentium， we see at once how the goods of an enemy came to be looked upon as nobody''s property， and therefore as capable of being acquired by the first occupant. The idea would occur spontaneously to persons practising the ancient forms of Warfare， when victory dissolved the organisation of the conquering army and dismissed the soldiers to indiscriminate plunder. It is probable， however， that originally it was only moveable property which was thus permitted to be acquired by the Captor. We know on independent authority that a very different rule prevailed in ancient Italy as to the acquisition of ownership in the soil of a conquered country， and we may therefore suspect that the application of the principle of occupancy to land （always a matter of difficulty） dates from the period when the Jus Gentium was becoming the Code of Nature， and that it is the result of a generalisation effected by the jurisconsults of the golden age. Their dogmas on the point are preserved in the Pandects of Justinian， and amount to an unqualified assertion that enemy''s property of every sort is res nullius to the other belligerent， and that Occupancy， by which the Captor makes them his own， is an institution of Natural Law. The rules which International jurisprudence derives from these positions have sometimes been stigmatised as needlessly indulgent to the ferocity and cupidity of combatants， but the charge has been made， I think， by persons who are unacquainted with the history of wars， and who are consequently ignorant how great an exploit it is to command obedience for a rule of any kind. The Roman principle of Occupancy， when it was admitted into the modern law of Capture in War， drew with it a number of subordinate canons， limiting and giving precision to its operation， and if the contests which have been waged since the treatise of Grotius became an authority， are compared with those of an earlier date， it will be seen that， as soon as the Roman maxims were received， Warfare instantly assumed a more tolerable complexion. If the Roman law of Occupancy is to be taxed with having had pernicious influence on any part of the modern Law of Nations， there is another chapter in it which may be said， with some reason， to have been injuriously affected. In applying to the discovery of new countries the same principles which the Romans had applied to the finding of a jewel， the Publicists forced into their service a doctrine altogether unequal to the task expected from it. Elevated into extreme importance by the discoveries of the great navigator of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries， it raised more disputes than it solved. The greatest uncertainty was very shortly found to exist on the very two points on which certainty was most required， the extent of the territory which was acquired for his sovereign by the discoverer， and the nature of the acts which were necessary to complete the ad prehensio or assumption of sovereign possession. Moreover， the principle itself， conferring as it did such enormous advantages as the consequence of a piece of good luck， was instinctively mutinied against by some of the most adventurous nations in Europe， the Dutch， the English， and the Portuguese. Our own countrymen， without expressly denying the rule of International Law， never did， in practice， admit the claim of the Spaniards to engross the whole of America south of the Gulf of Mexico， or that of the King of France to monopolise the valleys of the Ohio and the Mississippi. from the accession of Elizabeth to the accession of Charles the Second， it cannot be said that there was at any time thorough peace in the American waters， and the encroachments of the New England Colonists on the territory of the French King continued for almost a century longer. Bentham was so struck with the confusion attending the application of the legal principle， that he went out of his way to eulogise the famous Bull of Pope Alexander the Sixth， dividing the undiscovered countries of the world between the Spaniards and Portuguese by a line drawn one hundred leagues West of the Azores； and， grotesque as his praises may appear at first sight， it may be doubted whether the arrangement of Pope Alexander is absurder in principle than the rule of Public law， which gave half a continent to the monarch whose servants had fulfilled the conditions required by Roman jurisprudence for the acquisition of property in a valuable object which could be covered by the hand.

　　To all who pursue the inquiries which are the subject of this volume Occupancy is pre-eminently interesting on the score of the service it has been made to perform for speculative jurisprudence， in furnishing a supposed explanation of the origin of private property It was once universally believed that the proceeding implied in Occupancy was identical with the process by which the earth and its fruits， which were at first in common， became the allowed property of individuals. The course of thought which led to this assumption is not difficult to understand， if we seize the shade of difference which separates the ancient from the modern conception of Natural Law. The Roman lawyers had laid down that Occupancy was one of the Natural modes of acquiring property， and they undoubtedly believed that， were mankind living under the institutions of Nature， Occupancy would be one of their practices. How far they persuaded themselves that such a condition of the race had ever existed， is a point， as I have already stated， which their language leaves in much uncertainty； but they certainly do seem to have made the conjecture， which has at all times possessed much plausibility， that the ins