It is not contended that Hutchinson attained such prominence that he is a public figure for all purposes. Instead， respondents have argued that the District Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in holding that Hutchinson is a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his receipt of federal funds for research projects. That conclusion was based upon two factors： first， Hutchinson's successful application for federal funds and the reports in local newspapers of the federal grants； second， Hutchinson's access to the media， as demonstrated by the fact that some newspapers and wire services reported his response to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award. Neither of those factors demonstrates [443 U.S. 111， 135] that Hutchinson was a public figure prior to the controversy engendered by the Golden Fleece Award； his access， such as it was， came after the alleged libel.

　　On this record， Hutchinson's activities and public profile are much like those of countless members of his profession. His published writings reach a relatively small category of professionals concerned with research in human behavior. To the extent the subject of his published writings became a matter of controversy， it was a consequence of the Golden Fleece Award. Clearly， those charged with defamation cannot， by their own conduct， create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn.， Inc.， post， at 167-168.

　　Hutchinson did not thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence others. Respondents have not identified such a particular controversy； at most， they point to concern about general public expenditures. But that concern is shared by most and relates to most public expenditures； it is not sufficient to make Hutchinson a public figure. If it were， everyone who received or benefited from the myriad public grants for research could be classified as a public figure - a conclusion that our previous opinions have rejected. The "use of such subject-matter classifications to determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interests in this area." Time， Inc. v. Firestone， supra， at 456.

　　Moreover， Hutchinson at no time assumed any role of public prominence in the broad question of concern about expenditures. Neither his applications for federal grants nor his publications in professional journals can be said to have invited that degree of public attention and comment on his receipt of federal grants essential to meet the public figure level. The petitioner in Gertz v. Robert Welch， Inc.， had published books and articles on legal issues； he had been [443 U.S. 111， 136] active in local community affairs. Nevertheless， the Court concluded that his activities did not make him a public figure.

　　Finally， we cannot agree that Hutchinson had such access to the media that he should be classified as a public figure. Hutchinson's access was limited to responding to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award. He did not have the regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the accouterments of having become a public figure.

　　We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

　　Reversed and remanded.

　　MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins in all but footnote 10 of the Court's opinion. He cannot agree that the question whether a communication by a Congressman or a member of his staff with a federal agency is entitled to Speech or Debate Clause immunity depends upon whether the communication is defamatory. Because telephone calls to federal agency officials are a routine and essential part of the congressional oversight function， he believes such activity is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

　　Footnotes

　　[ Footnote 1 ] There is disagreement over the actual total. The speech said the total was "over $500，000." In preparation for trial， both sides have offered higher estimates of the total amount.

　　[ Footnote 2 ] Reports of Hutchinson's research were published in scientific journals. The research is not unlike the studies of primates reported in less technical periodicals such as the National Geographic. E. g.， Fossey， More Years with Mountain Gorillas， 140 National Geographic 574 （1971）； Galdikas-Brindamour， Orangutans， Indonesia's "People of the Forest，" 148 National Geographic 444 （1975）； Goodall， Life and Death at Gombe， 155 National Geographic 592 （1979）； Goodall， My Life Among Wild Chimpanzees， 124 National Geographic 272 （1963）； Strum， Life With the "Pumphouse Gang"： New Insights into Baboon Behavior， 147 National Geographic 672 （1975）。

　　[ Footnote 3 ] Proxmire is not certain that he actually delivered the speech on the Senate floor. He said that he might have merely inserted it into the Congressional Record. App. 220-221. In light of that uncertainty， the question arises whether a nondelivered speech printed in the Congressional Record is covered by the Speech or Debate Clause. This Court has never passed on that question and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals seemed to think it was important. Nevertheless， we assume， without deciding， that a speech printed in the Congressional Record carries immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause as though delivered on the floor.

　　[ Footnote 4 ] The parties agree that Proxmire referred to research like Hutchinson's on at least one television show. They do not agree whether there were other appearances on either radio or television. Hutchinson has suggested that there were others and has produced affidavits to support his suggestion. Proxmire cannot recall any others.

　　[ Footnote 5 ] Senate Resolution 543， 94th Cong.， 2d Sess. （1976）， authorized respondents and an additional member of Proxmire's staff to give deposition testimony. 122 Cong. Rec. 29876 （1976）。

　　[ Footnote 6 ] On April 13， 1976， Hutchinson had written to Proxmire requesting that he retract certain erroneous statements made in the 1975 press release.

　　[ Footnote 7 ] Of course， in light of Proxmire's uncertainty， see n. 3， supra， there is no assurance that there even was a speech on the Senate floor.

　　[ Footnote 8 ] The District Court also concluded that Hutchinson was a "public official." 431 F. Supp.， at 1327-1328. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether that conclusion was correct. 579 F.2d 1027， 1035 n. 14 （CA7 1978）。 We therefore express no opinion on the issue. The Court has not provided precise boundaries for the category of "public official"； it cannot be thought to include all public employees， however.

　　[ Footnote 9 ] Considering the nuances of the issues raised here， we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called "rule." The proof of "actual malice" calls a defendant's state of mind into question， New York Times Co. v. Sullivan， 376 U.S. 254 （1964）， and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition. See 10 C. Wright & A. Miller， Federal Practice and Procedure 2730. pp. 590-592 （1973）。 Cf. Herbert v. Lando， 441 U.S. 153 （1979）。 In the present posture of the case， however， the propriety of dealing with such complex issues by summary judgment is not before us.

　　[ Footnote 10 ] Respondents did not cross petition； neither did they argue that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the followup telephone calls made by Schwartz to governmental agencies or the television and radio interviews of Proxmire. Instead， respondents relied only upon the protection afforded by the First Amendment. In light of our conclusion， infra， that Hutchinson is not a public figure， respondents would nevertheless be entitled to raise the Speech or Debate Clause as an alternative ground for supporting the judgment. from our conclusion， infra， that the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect the republication of libelous remarks， it follows that libelous remarks in the followup telephone calls to executive agencies and in the television and radio interviews are not protected. Regardless of whether and to what extent the Speech or Debate Clause may protect calls to federal agencies seeking information， it does not protect attempts to influence the conduct of executive agencies or libelous comments made during the conversations. Cf. United States v. Johnson， 383 U.S. 169， 172 （1966）； United States v. Brewster， 408 U.S. 501， 512 -513 （1972）。

　　[ Footnote 11 ] Petitioner has not sought review of this conclusion； we express no opinion as to its correctness.

　　[ Footnote 12 ] But see T. Jefferson， A Manual of Parliamentary Practice 15-16 （1854）， reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 702 （S. Padover ed. 1943） （quoting Blackstone with approval）。

　　[ Footnote 13 ] Story acknowledged the arguments to the contrary： "It is proper， however， to apprise the learned reader， that it has been recently denied in congress by very distinguished lawyers， that the privilege of speech and debate in congress does not extend to publication of his speech. And they ground themselves upon an important distinction arising from the actual differences between English and American legislation. In the former， the publication of the debates is not strictly lawful， except by license of the house. In the latter， it is a common right， exercised and supported by the direct encouragement of the body. This reasoning deserves a very attentive examination." 2 J. Story， Commentaries on the Constitution 863， pp. 329-330 （1833）。 At oral argument， counsel for respondents referred to a note in the fifth edition of the Commentaries saying that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the circulation to constituents of copies of speeches made in [443 U.S. 111， 129] Congress. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. In attributing the note to Story， counsel made an understandable mistake. As explained in the preface to the fifth edition， that note was added by the editor， Melville Bigelow. The note does not appear in Story's first edition. Moreover， it is clear from the text of the note and the sources cited that Bigelow did not mean that there was an absolute privilege for defamatory remarks contained in a speech mailed to constituents as there would be if the mailing was protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Instead， he suggested that there was a qualified privilege， akin to that for accurate newspaper reports of legislative proceedings.

　　[ Footnote 14 ] It is worth nothing that the Rules of the Senate forbid disparagement of other Members on the floor. Senate Rule XIX （Apr. 1979）。 See also T. Jefferson， A Manual of Parliamentary Practice 40-41 （1854）， reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 714-715 （S. Padover ed. 1943）。

　　[ Footnote 15 ] Provision for the use of the frank， 39 U.S.C. 3210， does not alter our conclusion. Congress， by granting franking privileges， stationery allowances， and facilities to record speeches and statements for radio broadcast cannot expand the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause to render immune all that emanates via such helpful facilities.

　　[ Footnote 16 ] Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered whether the New York Times standard can apply to an individual defendant rather than to a media defendant. At oral argument， counsel for Hutchinson stated that he had not conceded that the New York Times [443 U.S. 111， 134] standard applied. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. This Court has never decided the question； our conclusion that Hutchinson is not a public figure makes it unnecessary to do so in this case.

　　MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN， dissenting.

　　I disagree with the Court's conclusion that Senator Proxmire's newsletters and press releases fall outside the protection of the speech-or-debate immunity. In my view， public criticism by legislators of unnecessary governmental expenditures， whatever its form， is a legislative act shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. I would affirm the judgment below for the reasons expressed in my dissent in Gravel v. United States， 408 U.S. 606， 648 （1972）。 [443 U.S. 111， 137]