See also L. Cushing， Elements of the Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies in the United States of America 604， p. 244 （1st ed. reprint 1971）。

　　Story summarized the state of the common law at the time the Constitution was drafted， recalling that Parliament had by then succeeded in its struggle to secure freedom of debate. But the privilege did not extend to republication of libelous remarks even though first made in Parliament. Thus， in King v. Lord Abingdon， 1 Esp. 225， 170 Eng. Rep. 337 （N.P. 1794）， Lord Chief Justice Kenyon rejected Lord Abingdon's argument that parliamentary privilege protected him from suit for republication of a speech first made in the House of Lords：

　　"[A]s to the words in question， had they been spoken in the House of Lords， and confined to its walls， [the] Court would have had no jurisdiction to call his Lordship before them， to answer for them as an offence； but . . . in the present case， the offence was the publication under his authority and sanction， and at his expense： . . . a member of Parliament had certainly a right to publish his speech， but that speech should not be made the vehicle of slander against any individual； if it was， it was a libel . . . ." Id.， at 228， 170 Eng. Rep.， at 338.

　　A similar result was reached in King v. Creevey， 1 M. & S. 273， 105 Eng. Rep. 102 （K. B. 1813）。 [443 U.S. 111， 130]

　　In Gravel v. United States， 408 U.S.， at 622 -626， we recognized that the doctrine denying immunity for republication had been accepted in the United States：

　　"[P]rivate publication by Senator Gravel . . . was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate； nor does questioning as to private publication threaten the integrity or independence of the Senate by impermissibly exposing its deliberations to executive influence." Id.， at 625.

　　We reaffirmed that principle in Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S.， at 314 -315：

　　"A Member of Congress may not with impunity publish a libel from the speaker's stand in his home district， and clearly the Speech or Debate Clause would not protect such an act even though the libel was read from an official committee report. The reason is that republishing a libel under such circumstances is not an essential part of the legislative process and is not part of that deliberative process `by which Members participate in committee and House proceedings.'" （Footnote omitted； quoting from Gravel v. United States， supra， at 625.） 14

　　We reach a similar conclusion here. A speech by Proxmire in the Senate would be wholly immune and would be available to other Members of Congress and the public in the Congressional Record. But neither the newsletters nor the press release was "essential to the deliberations of the Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process.

　　Respondents， however， argue that newsletters and press releases are essential to the functioning of the Senate； without [443 U.S. 111， 131] them， they assert， a Senator cannot have a significant impact on the other Senators. We may assume that a Member's published statements exert some influence on other votes in the Congress and therefore have a relationship to the legislative and deliberative process. But in Brewster， 408 U.S.， at 512 ， we rejected respondents' expansive reading of the Clause：

　　"It is well known， of course， that Members of the Congress engage in many activities other than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. These include . . . preparing so-called `news letters' to constituents， news releases， and speeches delivered outside the Congress."

　　There we went on to note that United States v. Johnson， 383 U.S. 169 （1966）， had carefully distinguished between what is only "related to the due functioning of the legislative process，" and what constitutes the legislative process entitled to immunity under the Clause：

　　"In stating that those things [Johnson's attempts to influence the Department of Justice] `in no wise related to the due functioning of the legislative process' were not covered by the privilege， the Court did not in any sense imply as a corollary that everything that `related' to the office of a Member was shielded by the Clause. Quite the contrary， in Johnson we held， citing Kilbourn v. Thompson， supra， that only acts generally done in the course of the process of enacting legislation were protected.

　　。 . . . .

　　"In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process.

　　。 . . . .

　　". . . In its narrowest scope， the Clause is a very large， albeit essential， grant of privilege. It has enabled reckless men to slander [by speech or debate] and even destroy [443 U.S. 111， 132] others with impunity， but that was the conscious choice of the Framers." 408 U.S.， at 513 -516. （Emphasis in original.）

　　We are unable to discern any "conscious choice" to grant immunity for defamatory statements scattered far and wide by mail， press， and the electronic media.

　　Respondents also argue that newsletters and press releases are privileged as part of the "informing function" of Congress. Advocates of a broad reading of the "informing function" sometimes tend to confuse two uses of the term "informing." In one sense， Congress informs itself collectively by way of hearings of its committees. It was in that sense that Woodrow Wilson used "informing" in a statement quoted by respondents. In reality， Wilson's statement related to congressional efforts to learn of the activities of the Executive Branch and administrative agencies； he did not include wideranging inquiries by individual Members on subjects of their choice. Moreover， Wilson's statement itself clearly implies a distinction between the informing function and the legislative function：

　　"Unless Congress have and use every means of acquainting itself with the acts and the disposition of the administrative agents of the government， the country must be helpless to learn how it is being served； and unless Congress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every form of discussion， the country must remain in embarrassing， crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is most important that it should understand and direct. The informing function of Congress should be preferred even to its legislative function. . . . [T]he only really self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates its administration." W. Wilson， Congressional Government 303 （1885）。

　　It is in this narrower Wilsonian sense that this Court has employed "informing" in previous cases holding that congressional [443 U.S. 111， 133] efforts to inform itself through committee hearings are part of the legislative function.

　　The other sense of the term， and the one relied upon by respondents， perceives it to be the duty of Members to tell the public about their activities. Valuable and desirable as it may be in broad terms， the transmittal of such information by individual Members in order to inform the public and other Members is not a part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative process. 15 As a result， transmittal of such information by press releases and newsletters is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

　　Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S. 306 （1973）， is not to the contrary. It dealt only with reports from congressional committees， and held that Members of Congress could not be held liable for voting to publish a report. Voting and preparing committee reports are the individual and collective expressions of opinion within the legislative process. As such， they are protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Newsletters and press releases， by contrast， are primarily means of informing those outside the legislative forum； they represent the views and will of a single Member. It does not disparage either their value or their importance to hold that they are not entitled to the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.

　　V

　　Since New York Times Co. v. Sullivan， 376 U.S. 254 （1964）， 16 this Court has sought to define the accommodation [443 U.S. 111， 134] required to assure the vigorous debate on the public issues that the First Amendment was designed to protect while at the same time affording protection to the reputations of individuals. E. g.， Time， Inc. v. Firestone， 424 U.S. 448 （1976）； Gertz v. Robert Welch， Inc.， 418 U.S. 323 （1974）； Rosenbloom v. Metromedia， Inc.， 403 U.S. 29 （1971）； St. Amant v. Thompson， 390 U.S. 727 （1968）； Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts， 388 U.S. 130 （1967）； Rosenblatt v. Baer， 383 U.S. 75 （1966）。 In Gertz v. Robert Welch， Inc.， the Court offered a general definition of "public figures"：

　　"For the most part those who attain this status [of public figure] have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly， those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event， they invite attention and comment." 418 U.S.， at 345 .

　　It is not contended that Hutchinson attained such prominence that he is a public figure for all purposes. Instead， respondents have argued that the District Court and the Court of Appeals were correct in holding that Hutchinson is a public figure for the limited purpose of comment on his receipt of federal funds for research projects. That conclusion was based upon two factors： first， Hutchinson's successful application for federal funds and the reports in local newspapers of the federal grants； second， Hutchinson's access to the media， as demonstrated by the fact that some newspapers and wire services reported his response to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award. Neither of those factors demonstrates [443 U.S. 111， 135] that Hutchinson was a public figure prior to the controversy engendered by the Golden Fleece Award； his access， such as it was， came after the alleged libel.

　　On this record， Hutchinson's activities and public profile are much like those of countless members of his profession. His published writings reach a relatively small category of professionals concerned with research in human behavior. To the extent the subject of his published writings became a matter of controversy， it was a consequence of the Golden Fleece Award. Clearly， those charged with defamation cannot， by their own conduct， create their own defense by making the claimant a public figure. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn.， Inc.， post， at 167-168.

　　Hutchinson did not thrust himself or his views into public controversy to influence others. Respondents have not identified such a particular controversy； at most， they point to concern about general public expenditures. But that concern is shared by most and relates to most public expenditures； it is not sufficient to make Hutchinson a public figure. If it were， everyone who received or benefited from the myriad public grants for research could be classified as a public figure - a conclusion that our previous opinions have rejected. The "use of such subject-matter classifications to determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded defamatory falsehoods may too often result in an improper balance between the competing interests in this area." Time， Inc. v. Firestone， supra， at 456.

　　Moreover， Hutchinson at no time assumed any role of public prominence in the broad question of concern about expenditures. Neither his applications for federal grants nor his publications in professional journals can be said to have invited that degree of public attention and comment on his receipt of federal grants essential to meet the public figure level. The petitioner in Gertz v. Robert Welch， Inc.， had published books and articles on legal issues； he had been [443 U.S. 111， 136] active in local community affairs. Nevertheless， the Court concluded that his activities did not make him a public figure.

　　Finally， we cannot agree that Hutchinson had such access to the media that he should be classified as a public figure. Hutchinson's access was limited to responding to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award. He did not have the regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the accouterments of having become a public figure.

　　We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

　　Reversed and remanded.

　　MR. JUSTICE STEWART joins in all but footnote 10 of the Court's opinion. He cannot agree that the question whether a communication by a Congressman or a member of his staff with a federal agency is entitled to Speech or Debate Clause immunity depends upon whether the communication is defamatory. Because telephone calls to federal agency officials are a routine and essential part of the congressional oversight function， he believes such activity is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.

　　Footnotes

　　[ Footnote 1 ] There is disagreement over the actual total. The speech said the total was "over $500，000." In preparation for trial， both sides have offered higher estimates of the total amount.

　　[ Footnote 2 ] Reports of Hutchinson's research were published in scientific journals. The research is not unlike the studies of primates reported in less technical periodicals such as the National Geographic. E. g.， Fossey， More Years with Mountain Gorillas， 140 National Geographic 574 （1971）； Galdikas-Brindamour， Orangutans， Indonesia's "People of the Forest，" 148 National Geographic 444 （1975）； Goodall， Life and Death at Gombe， 155 National Geographic 592 （1979）； Goodall， My Life Among Wild Chimpanzees， 124 National Geographic 272 （1963）； Strum， Life With the "Pumphouse Gang"： New Insights into Baboon Behavior， 147 National Geographic 672 （1975）。

　　[ Footnote 3 ] Proxmire is not certain that he actually delivered the speech on the Senate floor. He said that he might have merely inserted it into the Congressional Record. App. 220-221. In light of that uncertainty， the question arises whether a nondelivered speech printed in the Congressional Record is covered by the Speech or Debate Clause. This Court has never passed on that question and neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals seemed to think it was important. Nevertheless， we assume， without deciding， that a speech printed in the Congressional Record carries immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause as though delivered on the floor.

　　[ Footnote 4 ] The parties agree that Proxmire referred to research like Hutchinson's on at least one television show. They do not agree whether there were other appearances on either radio or television. Hutchinson has suggested that there were others and has produced affidavits to support his suggestion. Proxmire cannot recall any others.

　　[ Footnote 5 ] Senate Resolution 543， 94th Cong.， 2d Sess. （1976）， authorized respondents and an additional member of Proxmire's staff to give deposition testimony. 122 Cong. Rec. 29876 （1976）。

　　[ Footnote 6 ] On April 13， 1976， Hutchinson had written to Proxmire requesting that he retract certain erroneous statements made in the 1975 press release.

　　[ Footnote 7 ] Of course， in light of Proxmire's uncertainty， see n. 3， supra， there is no assurance that there even was a speech on the Senate floor.

　　[ Footnote 8 ] The District Court also concluded that Hutchinson was a "public official." 431 F. Supp.， at 1327-1328. The Court of Appeals did not decide whether that conclusion was correct. 579 F.2d 1027， 1035 n. 14 （CA7 1978）。 We therefore express no opinion on the issue. The Court has not provided precise boundaries for the category of "public official"； it cannot be thought to include all public employees， however.

　　[ Footnote 9 ] Considering the nuances of the issues raised here， we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called "rule." The proof of "actual malice" calls a defendant's state of mind into question， New York Times Co. v. Sullivan， 376 U.S. 254 （1964）， and does not readily lend itself to summary disposition. See 10 C. Wright & A. Miller， Federal Practice and Procedure 2730. pp. 590-592 （1973）。 Cf. Herbert v. Lando， 441 U.S. 153 （1979）。 In the present posture of the case， however， the propriety of dealing with such complex issues by summary judgment is not before us.

　　[ Footnote 10 ] Respondents did not cross petition； neither did they argue that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the followup telephone calls made by Schwartz to governmental agencies or the television and radio interviews of Proxmire. Instead， respondents relied only upon the protection afforded by the First Amendment. In light of our conclusion， infra， that Hutchinson is not a public figure， respondents would nevertheless be entitled to raise the Speech or Debate Clause as an alternative ground for supporting the judgment. from our conclusion， infra， that the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect the republication of libelous remarks， it follows that libelous remarks in the followup telephone calls to executive agencies and in the television and radio interviews are not protected. Regardless of whether and to what extent the Speech or Debate Clause may protect calls to federal agencies seeking information， it does not protect attempts to influence the conduct of executive agencies or libelous comments made during the conversations. Cf. United States v. Johnson， 383 U.S. 169， 172 （1966）； United States v. Brewster， 408 U.S. 501， 512 -513 （1972）。

　　[ Footnote 11 ] Petitioner has not sought review of this conclusion； we express no opinion as to its correctness.

　　[ Footnote 12 ] But see T. Jefferson， A Manual of Parliamentary Practice 15-16 （1854）， reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 702 （S. Padover ed. 1943） （quoting Blackstone with approval）。

　　[ Footnote 13 ] Story acknowledged the arguments to the contrary： "It is proper， however， to apprise the learned reader， that it has been recently denied in congress by very distinguished lawyers， that the privilege of speech and debate in congress does not extend to publication of his speech. And they ground themselves upon an important distinction arising from the actual differences between English and American legislation. In the former， the publication of the debates is not strictly lawful， except by license of the house. In the latter， it is a common right， exercised and supported by the direct encouragement of the body. This reasoning deserves a very attentive examination." 2 J. Story， Commentaries on the Constitution 863， pp. 329-330 （1833）。 At oral argument， counsel for respondents referred to a note in the fifth edition of the Commentaries saying that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the circulation to constituents of copies of speeches made in [443 U.S. 111， 129] Congress. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. In attributing the note to Story， counsel made an understandable mistake. As explained in the preface to the fifth edition， that note was added by the editor， Melville Bigelow. The note does not appear in Story's first edition. Moreover， it is clear from the text of the note and the sources cited that Bigelow did not mean that there was an absolute privilege for defamatory remarks contained in a speech mailed to constituents as there would be if the mailing was protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Instead， he suggested that there was a qualified privilege， akin to that for accurate newspaper reports of legislative proceedings.

　　[ Footnote 14 ] It is worth nothing that the Rules of the Senate forbid disparagement of other Members on the floor. Senate Rule XIX （Apr. 1979）。 See also T. Jefferson， A Manual of Parliamentary Practice 40-41 （1854）， reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 714-715 （S. Padover ed. 1943）。

　　[ Footnote 15 ] Provision for the use of the frank， 39 U.S.C. 3210， does not alter our conclusion. Congress， by granting franking privileges， stationery allowances， and facilities to record speeches and statements for radio broadcast cannot expand the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause to render immune all that emanates via such helpful facilities.

　　[ Footnote 16 ] Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals considered whether the New York Times standard can apply to an individual defendant rather than to a media defendant. At oral argument， counsel for Hutchinson stated that he had not conceded that the New York Times [443 U.S. 111， 134] standard applied. Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. This Court has never decided the question； our conclusion that Hutchinson is not a public figure makes it unnecessary to do so in this case.

　　MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN， dissenting.

　　I disagree with the Court's conclusion that Senator Proxmire's newsletters and press releases fall outside the protection of the speech-or-debate immunity. In my view， public criticism by legislators of unnecessary governmental expenditures， whatever its form， is a legislative act shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause. I would affirm the judgment below for the reasons expressed in my dissent in Gravel v. United States， 408 U.S. 606， 648 （1972）。 [443 U.S. 111， 137]