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ヒ樵毖菟抵鞣ú⑽薅隆５胤椒ㄔ何雌竟�"通知职责"所作之裁决涵义本身即可明知立法简讯并不受议员言论免责权之保障。
随后，地方法院始转以宪法第一条修正案为理由来解释其何以批准对源自新闻简讯及电业访问的争执应作明快之裁决。地方法院所下之结论为：
为确定被告之法律责任计，哈金森则被视为社会名流：有关于哈金森博士长期从事于公款资助之研究工作，其积极争取联邦及州政府之委托，地方报纸对其研究计划之报导以及社会公众对其自愿参与公款动支情事之兴趣等等，地方法院作为结论，认为为裁决本案之目的，原告系一社会名流人士。同时，原告本人亦在供词中坦认："任何公款之动支当然是社会所关心的事情。"
由于以上所达成之结论，地方法院送依据证词、诉状及申辩来审核哈金森控诉被告等之作为系一具"实际恶意"之请求。但地方法院发现本案并无真正所谓"实际恶意"之事实与问题存在。法院认为未作调查或报导失常都未能构成"实际恶意".同时认为在蒲、华二人之供词及诉状中均无任何证明显示蒲、华对其所作之声明之真实性曾有任何怀疑。地方法院引用其他法院之判例，在确定原告是否提具适证据证明对方有"实际恶意"一节，由法院对涉讼案件作明快裁决则系通案而非例外。
最后，地方法院裁决说：即使为本案之裁决计认定哈金森博士系一普通平民，故宪法第一条修正案之保障不适用于被告，但相关之州法亦授予权法院得作明快之裁决。
地方法院认为此处所称适用之州法系指密西根州或华府特区之法律。因在威斯康辛州之法律选择原则下（Choice-of-law Principles）未能决定何种法律应加适用，地方法院裁定哈金森不能在密西根州或华府特区管辖，请求赔偿。
联邦上诉法院维持地方法院原判决，确认宪法上议员言论免责权之规定系保障新闻稿及立法简讯中所载之议员声明。（579 F.2d 1027 CA 1978），上诉法院解释Doe v.McMillan，412 U.S.306（1973）一案系承认宪法对国会之"通知职责"为有限之保障，并下结论为：分发新闻稿及立法简讯并未超越立法目的所规定之条件。（579 F.2d，at 1033）。事后之电话（与政府有关机关）联络及蒲参议员在电视及广播电业所发表之声明虽均不受宪法上议员言论免责权之保障，但仍受宪法第一条修正案之保障，上诉法院在初步审理中系根据供词及申辩纪录而获致上述结论，并认定哈金森为一社会名流。（ld.，at 1034-1035）
之后，上诉法院再审查纪录以决定哈金森本人是否亦曾有"实际恶意"之表示。上诉法院同意地方法院之裁决"根据纪录，被告对其所发表之声明之实际或可能之'虚伪性'一无所知则不容置疑。（ld.，at 1035）"至原告同时提出其他申辩，认为地方法院在批准对其所控诽谤罪以外之罪状（诸如被告干涉其契约关系，蓄意造成精神折磨及侵犯其个人隐私权等）作明快裁决时亦犯有错误一节，亦为上诉法院所批驳：
本院（上诉法院）认为原告所提其他之伤害指控，仅系对被告所作之声明之反应而已。认其所指控的诽谤不实性本身不能在本案公开宣布，则原告即不能对因此所造成之伤害请求赔偿。
至地方法院裁决州法亦准许法院对被告作明快裁决一节，上诉法院则未处理。
Ⅲ
原告请求最高法院调查本案引起三项问题：一则涉及议员言论免责权条文的应用范围；二则牵涉宪法第一条修正案的应用；三则关系"明快裁决"的适当性，因为包括联邦宪法及州法的双重问题。至于宪法问题的发生是由于地方法院的看法，认为如果热衷联邦宪法第一条修正案的援用，则在诽谤诉讼中即需要一个对批准"明快裁决"持有亲切宽厚的司法态度才行。而州法问题的发生也是由于地方法院认定按照实际州法，哈金森即不能获得赔偿。
本院的惯例是假如能用非宪法理由可以处理之案件，即避免以宪法问题来裁决。（Siler v.Louisville Nashville R.Co.，213U.S.175，193，1909）如本院采取此一途径来处理本案，即可将原案发还上诉法院就其未加解决之州法问题予以重议。设地方法院已正确处理州法问题，即援用联邦宪法第一条修正案之解决方式即无必要。本院的结论为，基于对本案之特别考虑则需本安首先解决宪法问题。
宪法上关于议员论免责权之条款乃在保障国会义员"不仅免负诉讼后果，而且免受法律辩护的负担。"见Dombrowshi v. Eastland，387 U. S. 82，85（1967）；及Eastlnad v. U. S.Servicemen's Fund，421 U.s.491，503（1975）。如被告依宪法享有免责权，则其他问题即无需再议，因为依照宪法"议员言论对外不负责任".
一般而言，对宪法问题的考虑最终仍以宪法上议员言论免责权之条款解决。因之，本院理应将本案发还上诉法院考虑适用州法问题。但本案处理经过业已显示上诉法院无意维持地方法院过用州法解决之原则。本院揣度上诉法院之所以如此裁定即因其已有定论，即新闻稿及立法简讯均受联邦宪法议员言论免责条款之保障，上诉法院说明："新闻稿中暗示哈金森博士因此发财及其研究"容或重覆"之声明抑或有诽谤性这虚构成分。（579 F.2d，at 1035 n.15）鉴于以上说明，本院在Wolston v.Reader's Digest Assn.，inc.，Post，at 161 n.2一案所主张者亦适用于本案：
本院假定上诉法院一如本院均熟知一项一般原则，即凡在适用宪法问题之前先应以可以处理之法律或地方法律处理之。本院对上诉法院裁决意见中之注脚的解释是该院的管辖范围乃基于联邦与州之双重公民，该院认为如不涉及联邦宪法问题，则上诉案即无法处理。
鉴于处理本案之所必需，本院故须涉及联邦宪法第一条修正案及议员言论多责权之宪法条款。
Ⅳ
在支持上诉法院所作关于新闻稿及立法简讯均受宪法议员言论免责权条文保障之裁决一节上，被告则凭藉历史先例及当今国会的真实惯例。彼等辩称我国宪法之上议员言论免责条款之动力系源自于英国国会发展史，努力保护议员批评英皇动用国库开支的权利，以及下议院议长因在议会之外出版报告而被判弄。被告辩称时至今日在两院议场中极少有辩论或演讲。基此理由，被告坚持国会议员必需透过新闻发布及立法简讯以与其他议员沟通。例如，蒲参议员在其向法院之供词中说：
在十九年的参院工作中，我发现在议会上的声明或出现于国会纪录的事情往往未受到大多数参议员或几乎全总后从议员的注意，因为他们根本不看国会纪录。如果有人送给他们一份新闻稿之类的文件那就会受到他们的注意……。
被告也辩称一个国会议员责任的主要部分即是将正在讨论中的问题通知其选区选民及其他关心同一问题的议员。
在一百九十年的历史中，由本院直接裁决与议员言论免责权有关的案子相当少。Eastland v.U.S.Servicemen's Fund； Doe v.McMillan（1973）；Gravel v. U. S.（1972）；U. S. v. Brewster （1972）；Dombrowski v. Eastland； U. S. v. Johnson （1966）；Kilbourn v.Thompson （1881）。从议员言论免责权条文的字面上看，它当然只限于对"在两院言词及辩论"的狭义保障。但是本院对言论免责条款一个较切实际而非将议员言论免责的保障仅仅局限于议会会场的严格的字面意义。所以，本院裁决国会委员会所举办的听证会，即使它在证场之外举行也在保障之列；委员会的报告亦予保障。（参见 Dol v.McMillan；Gravel v. U. S.；Coffin v. coffin （1808）。
对议员言论免责条文所作之超越严格字面以外的变通解释迄今未远离仅限于保障立法活动之目的。根据杰弗逊的说法是：
免责权是限于在立法过程中在议会所作的事情……因为议员不得超越他的地位及职责的范围与限制（Thomas Jefferson，A Manual of Parliamentary Practice （1854）
担任拟订宪草人之一的威尔逊（James Wilson）曾任最高法院大法官，在一七九○年至一七九二年所作的多场演讲中亦表示同样的看法。他不赞成布拉克斯统W.Blackstone的主张
U.S. Supreme Court
HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE， 443 U.S. 111 （1979）
443 U.S. 111
HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS For THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.
No. 78-680.
Argued April 17， 1979.
Decided June 26， 1979.
Respondent United States Senator publicizes examples of wasteful governmental spending by awarding his "Golden Fleece of the Month Award." One such award was given to federal agencies that had funded petitioner scientist's study of emotional behavior in which he sought an objective measure of aggression， concentrating upon the behavior patterns of certain animals. The award was announced in a speech prepared with the help of respondent legislative assistant， the text of which was incorporated in a widely distributed press release. Subsequently， the award was also referred to in newsletters sent out by the Senator， in a television interview program on which he appeared， and in telephone calls made by the legislative assistant to the sponsoring federal agencies. Petitioner sued respondents in Federal District Court for defamation， alleging， inter alia， that in making the award and publicizing it nationwide， respondents had damaged him in his professional and academic standing. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents， holding that the Speech or Debate Clause afforded absolute immunity for investigating the funding of petitioner's research， for the speech in the Senate， and for the press release， since it fell within the "informing function" of Congress. The court further held that petitioner was a "public figure" for purposes of determining respondents' liability； that respondents were protected by the First Amendment thereby requiring petitioner to prove "actual malice"； and that based on the depositions， affidavits， and pleadings there was no genuine issue of material fact on the issue of actual malice， neither respondents' failure to investigate nor unfair editing and summarizing being sufficient to establish "actual malice." Finally， the court held that even if petitioner were found to be a "private person，" relevant state law required a summary judgment for respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed， holding that the Speech or Debate Clause protected the statements made in the press release and newsletters and that， although the followup telephone calls and the statements made on television were not protected by that Clause， they were protected by the First Amendment， since petitioner was a "public figure，" and that on the record there was no showing of "actual malice." [443 U.S. 111， 112]
Held：
1. While this Court's practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions if a dispositive nonconstitutional ground is available， special considerations in this case mandate that the constitutional questions first be resolved. If respondents have immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause， no other questions need be considered. And where it appears that the Court of Appeals would not affirm the District Court's state-law holding so that the appeal could not be decided without reaching the First Amendment issue， that issue will also be reached here. Pp. 122-123.
2. The Speech or Debate Clause does not protect transmittal of information by individual Members of Congress by press releases and newsletters. Pp. 123-133.
（a） There is nothing in the history of the Clause or its language suggesting any intent to create an absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory statements made outside the legislative Chambers； precedents support the conclusion that a Member may be held liable for republishing defamatory statements originally made in the Chamber. Pp. 127-130.
（b） Neither the newsletters nor the press release here was "essential to the deliberation of the Senate" and neither was part of the deliberative process. Gravel v. United States， 408 U.S. 606 ； Doe v. McMillan， 412 U.S. 306 . P. 130.
（c） The newsletters and press release were not privileged as part of the "informing function" of Members of Congress to tell the public about their activities. Individual Members' transmittal of information about their activities by press releases and newsletters is not part of the legislative function or the deliberations that make up the legislative process； in contrast to voting and preparing committee reports， which are part of Congress' function to inform itself， newsletters and press releases are primarily means of informing those outside the legislative forum and represent the views and will of a single Member. Doe v. McMillan， supra， distinguished. Pp： 132-133.
3. Petitioner is not a "public figure" so as to make the "actual malice" standard of proof of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan， 376 U.S. 254 ， applicable. Neither the fact that local newspapers reported the federal grants to petitioner for his research nor the fact that he had access to the news media as shown by reports of his response to the announcement of the Golden Fleece Award， demonstrates that he was a public figure prior to the controversy engendered by that award. His access， such as it was， came after the alleged libel and was limited to responding to the announcement of the award. Those charged with alleged defamation cannot， by their own conduct， create their own defense by making [443 U.S. 111， 113] the claimant a public figure. Nor is the concern about public expenditures sufficient to make petitioner a public figure， petitioner at no time having assumed any role of public prominence in the broad question of such concern. Pp. 133-136.
579 F.2d 1027， reversed and remanded.
BURGER， C. J.， delivered the opinion of the Court， in which WHITE， MARSHALL， BLACKMUN， POWELL， REHNQUIST， and STEVENS， JJ.， joined， and in all but n. 10 of which STEWART， J.， joined. STEWART， J.， filed a statement concurring in part and dissenting in part， post， p. 136. BRENNAN， J.， filed a dissenting opinion， post， p. 136.
Michael E. Cavanaugh argued the cause and filed a briefs for petitioner.
Alan Raywid argued the cause and filed a brief for respondents. *
[ Footnote * ] Bruce J. Montgomery and John D. Lane filed a brief for the American Psychological Association et al. as amici curiae urging reversal. Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Richard M. Schmidt， Jr.， for the American Society of Newspaper Editors et al.； and by Chester H. Smith for Warren G. Magnuson et al. Stanley M. Brand filed a brief for Thomas P. O'Neill， Jr.， Speaker of the United States House of Representatives， et al. as amici curiae.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.
We granted certiorari， 439 U.S. 1066 （1979）， to resolve three issues： （1） Whether a Member of Congress is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution， Art. I， 6， against suits for allegedly defamatory statements made by the Member in press releases and newsletters； （2） whether petitioner Hutchinson is either a "public figure" or a "public official，" thereby making applicable the "actual malice" standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan， 376 U.S. 254 （1964）； and （3） whether respondents were entitled to summary judgment. [443 U.S. 111， 114]
Ronald Hutchinson， a research behavioral scientist， sued respondents， William Proxmire， a United States Senator， and his legislative assistant， Morton Schwartz， for defamation arising out of Proxmire's giving what he called his "Golden Fleece" award. The "award" went to federal agencies that had sponsored Hutchinson's research. Hutchinson alleged that in making the award and publicizing it nationwide， respondents had libeled him， damaging him in his professional and academic standing， and had interfered with his contractual relations. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
We reverse and remand to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Respondent Proxmire is a United States Senator from Wisconsin. In March 1975， he initiated the "Golden Fleece of the Month Award" to publicize what he perceived to be the most egregious examples of wasteful governmental spending. The second such award， in April 1975， went to the National Science Foundation， the National Aeronautics and Space Administration， and the Office of Naval Research， for spending almost half a million dollars during the preceding seven years to fund Hutchinson's research. 1
At the time of the award， Hutchinson was director of research at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital. Before that he had held a similar position at the Ft. Custer State Home. Both the hospital and the home are operated by the Michigan State Department of Mental Health； he was therefore a state employee in both positions. During most of the period in question he was also an adjunct professor at Western Michigan University. When the research department at Kalamazoo [443 U.S. 111， 115] State Mental Hospital was closed in June 1975， Hutchinson became research director of the Foundation for Behavioral Research， a nonprofit organization. The research funding was transferred from the hospital to the foundation.
The bulk of Hutchinson's research was devoted to the study of emotional behavior. In particular， he sought an objective measure of aggression， concentrating upon the behavior patterns of certain animals， such as the clenching of jaws when they were exposed to various aggravating stressful stimuli. 2 The National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the Navy were interested in the potential of this research for resolving problems associated with confining humans in close quarters for extended periods of time in space and undersea exploration.
The Golden Fleece Award to the agencies that had sponsored Hutchinson's research was based upon research done for Proxmire by Schwartz. While seeking evidence of wasteful governmental spending， Schwartz read copies of reports that Hutchinson had prepared under grants from NASA. Those reports revealed that Hutchinson had received grants from the Office of Naval Research， the National Science Foundation， and the Michigan State Department of Mental Health. Schwartz also learned that other federal agencies had funded Hutchinson's research. After contacting a number of federal and state agencies， Schwartz helped to prepare a speech for Proxmire to present in the Senate on April 18， 1975； the text was then incorporated into an advance press release， with only [443 U.S. 111， 116] the addition of introductory and concluding sentences. Copies were sent to a mailing list of 275 members of the news media throughout the United States and abroad.
Schwartz telephoned Hutchinson before releasing the speech to tell him of the award； Hutchinson protested that the release contained an inaccurate and incomplete summary of his research. Schwartz replied that he thought the summary was fair.
In the speech， Proxmire described the federal grants for Hutchinson's research， concluding with the following comment： 3
"The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry enough to scream and kick or even clench my jaw. It seems to me it is outrageous.
"Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers as well as his monkeys grind their teeth. In fact， the good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and in the process made a monkey out of the American taxpayer.
"It is time for the Federal Government to get out of this `monkey business.' In view of the transparent worthlessness of Hutchinson's study of jaw-grinding and biting by angry or hard-drinking monkeys， it is time we put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats who fund him have been taking of the taxpayer." 121 Cong. Rec. 10803 （1975）。 [443 U.S. 111， 117]
In May 1975， Proxmire referred to his Golden Fleece Awards in a newsletter sent to about 100，000 people whose names were on a mailing list that included constituents in Wisconsin as well as persons in other states. The newsletter repeated the essence of the speech and the press release. Later in 1975， Proxmire appeared on a television interview program where he referred to Hutchinson's research， though he did not mention Hutchinson by name. 4
The final reference to the research came in a newsletter in February 1976. In that letter， Proxmire summarized his Golden Fleece Awards of 1975. The letter did not mention Hutchinson's name， but it did report：
" - The NSF， the Space Agency， and the Office of Naval Research won the `Golden Fleece' for spending jointly $500，000 to determine why monkeys clench their jaws.
。 . . . .
"All the studies on why monkeys clench their jaws were dropped. No more monkey business." App. 168-171.
After the award was announced， Schwartz， acting on behalf of Proxmire， contacted a number of the fede |
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